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ABSTRACT
Since Biggio et al. (2013) and Szegedy et al. (2013) first drew attention to adver-
sarial examples, there has been a flood of research into defending and attacking
machine learning models. However, almost all proposed attacks assume white-
box access to a model. In other words, the attacker is assumed to have perfect
knowledge of the models weights and architecture. With this insider knowledge, a
white-box attack can leverage gradient information to craft adversarial examples.
Black-box attacks assume no knowledge of the model weights or architecture.
These attacks craft adversarial examples using information only contained in the
logits or hard classification label. Here, we assume the attacker can use the log-
its in order to find an adversarial example. Empirically, we show that 2-sided
stochastic gradient estimation techniques are not sensitive to scaling parameters,
and can be used to mount powerful black-box attacks requiring relatively few
model queries.
1 GRADIENT ESTIMATION METHODS
Black-box attacks usually rely on either the transferability property of adversarial examples
(Papernot et al. (2016)) or gradient estimation techniques. Gradient estimation techniques such as
finite differences come at the expense of the number of model queries. To estimate the gradient of
a d dimensional vector requires 2d model queries, since the gradient of each dimension is measured
independently. For this reason, recent work has explored stochastic methods for approximating the
true gradient (Ilyas et al. (2018); Uesato et al. (2018)). Given a model f 1 and an input x ∈ Rd, we
estimate the gradient by one of the following methods:
1
n
n∑
i=i
[
f(x+ δ∆i)− f(x)
δ
]
· ξi (1)
1
n
n∑
i=i
[
f(x+ δ∆i)− f(x− δ∆i)
2δ
]
· ξi (2)
where δ ∈ R is a small constant and ξi,∆i ∈ Rd are random vectors sampled from some dis-
tribution P . We observed that the choice of P is largely unimportant; black-box attack success
for P ∼ N (0, I) (NES (Ilyas et al. (2018))), P ∼ Bernoulli±1 (SPSA (Uesato et al. (2018))),
P ∼ U(−1, 1) (RDSA) is approximately equivalent. Gradient estimation given by (1) is referred
to as 1-sided, and gradient estimation given by (2) is referred to as 2-sided. For all attacks, we take
ξi = ∆
−1
i
, and the estimation can be viewed as finite differences on a random basis.
2 EXPERIMENTS
We run the PGD attack (Madry et al. (2017)) with gradient estimation, for ǫ = 0.05 on the NIPS
2017 adversarial vision competition dataset (Kurakin et al. (2018)). This consists of 1000 Imagenet-
1 For notational convenience, we represent both the model evaluation and loss function evaluation of an
input with respect to a target label by f .
1
Table 1: Attack results for different estimation methods.
Attack δ Success Rate (%) Median Queries
NES (2-sided)
1e-2 100 14815
1e-3 100 17723
1e-4 100 20222
RDSA (2-sided)
1e-2 100 13719
1e-3 100 18564
1e-4 100 19635
SPSA (2-sided)
1e-2 100 14586
1e-3 100 17442
1e-4 100 19916
SPSA (1-sided)
1e-2 9.88 50206
1e-3 91.59 23816
1e-4 99.89 10244
like images of size 299× 299× 3. For each image, we select the least likely class as the adversarial
example target class. We consider the attack successful if the predicted class is the target class and
‖x− xadv‖∞ < ǫ, and the attack requires fewer than one million queries to the model. Table 1
shows the results for different choices of random directions. For 2-sided attacks, all achieve perfect
success rates in crafting adversarial examples, while exhibiting little sensitivity to the choice of δ.
For 1-sided SPSA, the attack is extremely sensitive to the choice of δ; for a δ of 0.01, the attack is
successful fewer than one times in ten, while a δ of 0.0001 the attack has near perfect success rate
and also requires on average only 10244 queries, 3475 fewer than the best 2-sided attack.
In conclusion, we found that the choice of random direction is largely unimportant in practical
attacks. An attacker choosing a 1-sided perturbation may require fewer queries to the model,
however this is heavily dependent on the choice of δ. Reproducible code can be found at
https://github.com/jhayes14/black-box-attacks.
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